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Anticipatory 
Governance  
how well is New Zealand 
safeguarding the future?
Anticipatory governance is forward-
looking (Fuerth with Faber, 2012, 2013). 
It takes the long view, regularly scanning 
the horizon for warning signals, as well as 
new, but often unexpected, opportunities. 
It assesses the long-term consequences 
of today’s decisions and events, seeking 
wherever possible to minimise future 
harms. It considers risks – especially 
systemic risks – over extended timeframes 
and develops the capability and tools for 
rigorous risk management. It posits a 
range of scenarios and conducts regular 
‘stress tests’ to ascertain the robustness of 
current institutional, policy and regulatory 
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The attributes of anticipatory governance
Good governance has many attributes. Among these are 
anticipating tomorrow’s problems, protecting the long-
term public interest, and endeavouring to ‘future-proof ’ the 
state (Boston et al., 2014). Sound anticipatory governance, 
in other words, is a critical ingredient. It is fundamental 
to advancing better government. But what exactly does it 
mean? Here are some suggestions.
The future whispers while the present shouts.
– Al Gore
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settings. It recognises the importance of 
resilience and the interconnected nature 
of its various dimensions (i.e. economic, 
social, infrastructural, institutional, 
environmental and cultural). It does 
not yearn for false certainties. Instead, it 
embraces the need, given a dynamic and 
unpredictable world, for anticipatory 
planning and adaptive management. It 
recognises that the past may provide little 
guidance to the future. After all, long-
standing trends may cease and gradual 
adjustments may be superseded by non-
linear changes: disruptive technologies, 
natural disasters, systemic financial 
failures or abrupt climatic shifts may 
fundamentally alter a nation’s trajectory.
For such reasons, anticipatory 
governance is proactive. It values 
vigilance, preparedness, precaution 
and wise stewardship. As a general 
rule, it favours prevention over cure. 
It commends good evidence, critical 
evaluation and continuous improvement. 
It celebrates creativity, curiosity, 
innovation and imaginative reflection. It 
endorses a holistic approach to assessing 
performance: it focuses not only on fiscal 
deficits, but also on social, ecological 
and democratic deficits. Equally, it 
acknowledges the threat posed by deficits 
in adaptive capacity (Lawrence, 2016), 
all the more so in an era of remarkable 
technological advances, unprecedented 
environmental changes and multiple 
hazards. 
In protecting future interests, 
anticipatory governance seeks robust, 
yet flexible, democratic institutions and 
processes. In so doing, it is alert to the 
insights of behavioural economics and 
social psychology, especially the influence 
of cognitive biases on decision-making 
(Kahnemann, 2011; Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008). Likewise, it recognises the dangers 
of path dependence, vested interests 
and political myopia. For such reasons, 
it chooses institutional mechanisms, 
analytical tools, policy frameworks and 
‘commitment devices’1 which bring the 
long term into short-term focus and ensure 
that tomorrow’s interests are actively 
considered – and properly represented – 
in today’s decisions. The goal, in short, 
is to embed the future in the present, 
thereby ameliorating the presentist bias 
that often afflicts democratic processes 
(Healy and Malhorta, 2009; Heller, 2003; 
Jacobs, 2011, 2016; MacKenzie, 2013; 
Thompson, 2005, 2010).
Of course, the attributes of 
anticipatory governance enunciated above 
are ambitious and demanding. They serve 
as an ideal to which governments should 
aspire. In practice, for understandable 
reasons, most fall short. Yet, against such 
an ideal, how well does New Zealand 
perform? What is the quality of our 
anticipatory governance? What strengths 
and weaknesses are apparent? How well 
positioned is New Zealand to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century? To what 
extent are the country’s governance 
arrangements and policy frameworks 
likely to protect the long-term public 
interest – both the interests of our ‘future 
selves’ and those of future generations?
This article ponders these questions. 
First, it highlights briefly the wide 
range of risks, both global and local, 
that contemporary governments must 
confront. One of these is endogenous: it is 
the risk to good governance from within 
– namely the failure of policymakers 
to exercise proper foresight. Second, it 
outlines various criteria for assessing 
the quality of anticipatory governance. 
Third, on the basis of these criteria it 
briefly evaluates the quality of New 
Zealand’s policymaking institutions and 
frameworks. Finally, it suggests a number 
of reforms to enhance good anticipatory 
governance. 
Several caveats deserve mention. The 
topics under discussion here are large 
and complex. They cannot be adequately 
addressed in a short article. Accordingly, 
the following analysis is partial and 
incomplete: it is an aperitif, not a full-
course meal. Further, while this article 
comments on governance arrangements 
in New Zealand at both the central and 
subnational levels, the primary focus 
is on central government. In part this 
reflects the limitations of space. But it 
also recognises that New Zealand is a 
highly centralised unitary state, with the 
central government having responsibility 
for most of the important areas of public 
policy, such as health care, education, 
social services, taxation and transfer 
payments, including the regulation of 
private sector activities that are vital to 
risk management (e.g. the provision of 
telecommunications infrastructure).2 
Finally, in an interdependent world with 
numerous supranational challenges – 
including many global collective action 
problems – that require international 
cooperation for effective solutions, nation 
states have only a limited capacity to 
navigate their own course, let alone fully 
protect all their future interests.
Facing an uncertain future
In considering the quality of anticipatory 
governance it is imperative to recognise 
that the future is uncertain. We cannot 
know for sure what will happen, even 
tomorrow. Major, unexpected and hard-
to-predict events – or what are variously 
called ‘black swans’ or ‘wild cards’ – are 
inevitable (Smil, 2006; Taleb, 2007). And 
the further we probe into the future, 
the deeper the level of uncertainty 
we encounter. The quest for sound 
anticipatory governance, therefore, must 
start on the basis of both realism and 
humility about what we can reasonably 
foresee or predict. As Donald Rumsfeld, 
the former US secretary of defence, 
famously put it in 2002: ‘there are known 
unknowns; that is to say we know there 
are some things we do not know. But 
there are also unknown unknowns – the 
ones we don’t know we don’t know’. 
Despite such ‘unknown unknowns’, 
many of the risks that governments face, 
both now and in the more distant future, 
can be readily identified. Of course, the 
number of such risks is very large, and 
their likelihood and potential impacts 
are highly variable. To assist with the task 
of assessing the nature and seriousness 
of such risks, many international 
organisations, think tanks and businesses 
prepare regular, detailed risk analyses. 
One such example is the World Economic 
Forum, which publishes an annual report 
on global risks. This is based partly on 
an international survey of leaders from 
business, government, academia, civil 
society organisations and international 
organisations. Table 1 summarises 28 
types of global risks, grouped into five 
categories: economic, environmental, 
geopolitical, social and technological. The 
risks listed here represent those which 
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Table 1: Global risks* as assessed by the World Economic Forum in 2015
General category Type of risk Description
1 Economic 1 Asset bubble in a major economy Unsustainably overpriced assets, such as commodities, housing, shares, etc. in a major economy or region
2 Deflation in a major economy Prolonged ultra-low inflation or deflation in a major economy or region
3 Energy price shock to the global 
economy
Sharp and/or sustained energy price increases that place further economic pressures on highly energy-
dependent industries and consumers
4 Failure of a major financial 
mechanism or institution
Collapse of a financial institution and/or inefficient functioning of a financial system with implications 
throughout the global economy
5 Failure/shortfall of critical 
infrastructure
Failure to adequately invest in, upgrade and secure infrastructure networks leads to a breakdown with 
system-wide implications
6 Fiscal crisis in key economies Excessive debt burdens generate sovereign debt crisis and/or liquidity crises
7 High structural unemployment or 
underemployment
A sustained high level of unemployment or underutilisation of the productive capacity of the employed 
population
8 Unmanageable inflation Unmanageable increase in the general price level of goods and services in key economies
2 Environmental 1 Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, 
storms, etc.)
Major property, infrastructure and environmental damage as well as human loss caused by extreme weather 
events 
2 Failure of climate change adaptation Governments and businesses fail to enforce or enact effective measures to protect populations and to help 
businesses affected by climate change to adapt
3 Major biodiversity loss and 
ecosystem collapse (land or ocean)
Irreversible consequences for the environment resulting in severely depleted resources for humankind as 
well as industries such as fishing, forestry, pharmaceuticals
4 Major natural catastrophes Major property, infrastructure and environmental damage as well as human loss caused by geophysical 
disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, tsunamis or geomagnetic storms
5 Man-made environmental 
catastrophes (e.g. oil spill, 
radioactive contamination)
Failure to prevent major man-made catastrophes causing harm to lives, human health, infrastructure, 
property, economic activity and the environment
3 Geopolitical 1 Failure of national governance Inability to efficiently govern a nation of geopolitical importance due to weak rule of law, corruption, illicit 
trade, organised crime, impunity or political deadlock
2 Interstate conflict with regional 
consequences
A bilateral or multilateral dispute between states escalates into economic (e.g. trade/currency wars, resource 
nationalisation), military, cyber, societal or other conflict
3 Large-scale terrorist attacks Individuals or non-state groups with political or religious goals successfully inflict large-scale human or 
material damage
4 State collapse or crisis (e.g. civil 
conflict, military coup, failed states, 
etc.)
State collapse of geopolitical importance due to internal violence, regional or global instability and military 
coup, civil conflict, failed states, etc.
5 Weapons of mass destruction Nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological technologies and materials are deployed, creating international 
crises and potential for significant destruction
4 Societal 1 Failure of urban planning Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and associated infrastructure create social, environmental and health 
challenges
2 Food crises Access to appropriate quantities and quality of food and nutrition becomes inadequate, unaffordable or 
unreliable on a major scale
3 Large-scale involuntary migration Large-scale involuntary migration due to conflict, disasters, or environmental or economic reasons
4 Profound social instability Major social movements or protests (e.g. street riots, social unrest, etc.) disrupt political and social stability, 
negatively affecting populations and economic activity
5 Rapid and massive spread of 
infectious diseases
Bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi cause uncontrolled spread of infectious diseases (e.g. due to resistance 
to antibiotics, antivirals and other treatments), leading to widespread fatalities and economic disruption
6 Water crises A significant decline in the available quality and quantity of fresh water, resulting in harmful effects on 
human health and/or economic activity
5 Technological 1 Breakdown of critical information 
infrastructure and networks
Systemic failures of critical information infrastructure (e.g. internet, satellites, etc.) and networks negatively 
impact on industrial production, public services and communications
2 Large-scale cyber attacks State-sponsored, state-affiliated, criminal or terrorist large-scale cyber attacks cause an infrastructure 
breakdown and/or loss of trust in the internet 
3 Massive incident of data fraud/theft Criminal or state-sponsored wrongful exploitation of private or official data takes place on an unprecedented 
scale
4 Massive and widespread misuse of 
technologies 
Massive and widespread misuse of technologies, such as 3D printing, artificial intelligence, geo-engineering 
and synthetic biology, causing human, environmental and economic damage
Source: World Economic Forum (2015), pp.53-54
*A global risk is defined as an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative impact for several countries or industries within the next decade.
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were thought in 2015 to pose the greatest 
threat over the coming decade. 
The annual assessments undertaken by 
the World Economic Forum also identify 
the top five global risks, first by their 
likelihood, and second by their potential 
impact. The results for 2013, 2014 and 
2015 are outlined in Table 2. Whatever 
the validity of such assessments, several 
matters are interesting to note. For one 
thing, at least a third of the global risks 
rated among the top five over the past 
three years relate directly or indirectly to 
climate change (e.g. water crises, extreme 
weather events and the challenges of 
adaptation). For another, about a quarter 
concern economic management (e.g. 
large fiscal imbalances, systemic financial 
failures and high unemployment). 
Significantly too, whereas severe income 
inequality figured prominently in both 
2013 and 2014, it was not included among 
the top five risks in 2015. By contrast, 
interstate conflicts and the failure of 
national governance did not register 
among the top five risks in either 2013 
or 2014 but were included in 2015 – no 
doubt reflecting the widening conflicts 
in the Middle East and North Africa 
and the destabilising political impacts of 
the mass migration of displaced people. 
The significant changes in the top-
ranked risks over a relatively limited time 
horizon highlights not only how quickly 
risk perceptions can adjust but also the 
wisdom of regular monitoring and re-
evaluation. 
New Zealand faces a distinctive set 
of risks (Basher, 2016; Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
2007; Local Government New Zealand, 
2014; Warren, 2014). In particular, it is 
exposed to a range of significant natural 
hazards, such as earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, tsunamis and extreme weather 
events. Also, its economy relies heavily 
on primary production and is thus 
vulnerable to adverse impacts from pests 
and diseases. The enormous damage 
caused by the Canterbury earthquakes 
during 2010–11 (estimated at about $40 
billion) highlights the scale of the risk 
(and potential contingent losses) from 
major seismic events near significant 
population centres.
Political risks – inadequate foresight and a 
presentist bias
As noted earlier, there is another kind of 
risk that deserves specific mention, namely 
that governments will fail to give proper 
attention to readily detectable threats or 
fail to pay sufficient heed to major societal 
trends or emerging opportunities. For 
instance, governments may be slow to 
adjust their regulatory policies to reflect 
changing technologies (e.g. drones or 
autonomous vehicles) or social conditions 
(e.g. evolving family structures). Likewise, 
they may fail to consider the economic and 
social implications of major technological 
innovations, such as advanced robotics 
and artificial intelligence. In short, 
governments may fail to exercise proper 
foresight – by anticipating problems, 
considering the available policy responses 
(including the option value of delay), and 
adjusting their policy settings to reflect 
new evidence, evolving risk assessments 
and other changing circumstances.
Among the risks which may be 
overlooked or poorly addressed by 
governments is a particular class of 
policy problems variously referred to as 
‘looming’, ‘creeping’, ‘slow’, ‘slow-burner’ 
or ‘emerging’ (European Environment 
Agency, 2013; Olson, 2016). Such 
problems tend to grow gradually and 
sometimes imperceptibly, with a long 
time lag between cause and effect. The 
negative impacts may be on the radar and 
their potential to cause significant long-
term harm may be evident (at least to 
the relevant experts), but they generally 
lack vivid, dramatic or unmistakeable 
early warning signals which can serve 
to mobilise public concern, thereby 
prompting a governmental response. As 
a result, creeping problems often receive 
much less attention from policymakers 
than they deserve. This, in turn, may 
reduce or even eliminate the possibility 
of implementing low-cost solutions and 
shift the burden of mitigation onto future 
citizens and taxpayers. Worse, in some 
cases the failure to intervene early may 
lead to serious and irreversible damage, 
with huge potential implications for the 
well-being of future generations.
Among the many contemporary 
‘creeping’ problems facing governments 
are the following: 
•	 long-term	demographic	changes	such	
as population ageing; 
•	 the	growing	obesity	pandemic;	
•	 the	spread	of	antimicrobial	
resistance; 
Table 2: The five top global risks in terms of likelihood and impact, 2013–15
2013 2014 2015
Ranking Likelihood Impact Likelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
1st Severe income 
disparity
Major systemic 
financial failure
Income disparity Fiscal crises Interstate conflict with 
regional consequences
Water crises
2nd Chronic fiscal 
imbalances
Water supply 
crisis
Extreme weather events Climate change Extreme weather events Rapid and massive 
spread of infectious 
diseases
3rd Rising greenhouse 
gas emissions
Chronic fiscal 
imbalances
Unemployment and 
underemployment
Water crises Failure of national 
governance
Weapons of mass 
destruction
4th Water supply crises Diffusion of 
weapons of mass 
destruction 
Climate change Unemployment and 
underemployment
State collapse or crisis Interstate conflict 
with regional 
consequences
5th Management of 
population ageing
Failure of climate 
change adaptation
Cyber attacks Critical information 
infrastructure breakdown
High unemployment and 
underemployment
Failure of climate 
change adaptation
Source: World Economic Forum (2015), p.14
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•	 the	gradual	increase	in	traffic	
congestion in major urban areas; 
•	 the	growing	economic	and	
environmental impacts of climate 
change and the related acidification 
of the world’s oceans; 
•	 the	gradual	loss	of	freshwater	
supplies due to the depletion of 
aquifers, deteriorating water quality, 
the over-allocation of freshwater 
resources, and changing climatic 
conditions; 
•	 the	increasing	damage	to	ecosystem	
services from pollution, pests, soil 
erosion and the loss of habitats; and
•	 the	gradual	loss	of	biodiversity	and	
wilderness areas.
There are at least four reasons why 
governments may fail to address creeping 
problems expeditiously or effectively 
(Boston, forthcoming; Jacobs, 2011; Olson, 
2016). First, the problem may not be 
detected sufficiently early by the relevant 
authorities, or the nature of the risks may 
be poorly communicated to those within 
the policy community who are responsible 
for taking action. Failures of this nature 
may be attributed to poor monitoring, 
inadequate reporting, ambiguous or 
conflicting evidence, a lack of imagination 
(e.g. a failure to think through the possible 
consequences carefully and logically), 
excessive governmental secrecy, and a 
human tendency to underestimate and 
downplay future risks.
Second, there may be attentional 
deficits within the governmental system 
and the wider polity (i.e. the phenomenon 
of ‘out of sight, out of mind’). 
Policymakers are faced with numerous 
urgent problems and multiple demands. 
These can easily distract them and result 
in only limited attention being given to 
creeping problems and other longer-term 
challenges. Similarly, in the absence of 
vivid and unambiguous warning signals, 
there will be little pressure from the public 
for governments to take precautionary 
measures or early remedial action. 
Third, many creeping problems are 
‘trans-boundary’ (or even cross-border) 
in nature and thus require coordinated 
responses from several tiers of government 
and/or from multiple organisations. But 
securing the necessary coordination is 
often hard because of the siloed structure 
of government departments and agencies 
and the absence of structures and 
incentives to deal with systemic and 
cross-cutting risks.
Fourth, and related to this, many 
creeping problems are relatively ‘wicked’ 
in the sense that they have multiple causes 
and lack complete or definitive solutions. 
Additionally, the available strategies 
to ameliorate them typically generate 
significant intertemporal trade-offs. That 
is to say, the costs – whether fiscal or 
regulatory – fall disproportionately in 
the near term while the benefits often 
take many years to be realised. Non-
simultaneous exchanges or cost–benefit 
asymmetries of this nature are inherently 
challenging politically (Jacobs, 2011). They 
require what are often referred to as ‘hard 
calls’. Understandably, governments may 
be fearful of the electoral consequences 
and thus reluctant to take preventative 
steps. Accordingly, despite the long-term 
risks being widely recognised and despite 
expectations that any delay in responding 
will impose greater overall costs, 
measures to mitigate the problem may 
be postponed. Alternatively, governments 
may act half-heartedly, choosing policies 
which minimise any short-term political 
damage. 
There is also a risk of dynamic or 
time inconsistency (Elster, 2000; Hovi, 
Sprinz and Underdal, 2009; Kyland and 
Prescott, 1977). To be effective, many 
policies require sustained effort over 
lengthy periods and major changes in 
mass behaviour or social institutions. 
Yet governments cannot bind their 
successors. Significantly, too, most 
policies are reversible, at least to some 
degree. If policies aimed at mitigating 
future risks are unpopular or impose 
significant costs on powerful groups, 
a future government may decide to 
weaken or even terminate them. Mindful 
of such risks, policymakers may be even 
more reluctant to take decisive measures 
to confront a creeping problem. The net 
result is that such problems are likely 
to be tackled late or inadequately (or 
both). 
The imposition of price-based policies 
in Australia and New Zealand to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions provides a 
good example. On both sides of the 
Tasman, governments delayed enacting 
effective policies to mitigate climate 
change for many years. And almost as 
soon as price-based policies had been 
implemented they were either overturned 
or significantly watered down by a new 
government (Chapman, 2015).  
In summary, sound anticipatory 
governance requires policymakers to 
identify, assess, manage and mitigate 
multiple risks. In fulfilling these 
responsibilities they confront the challenge 
that some of the measures required 
for prudent long-term governance 
are politically unattractive. In such 
circumstances there is a constant risk that 
short-term considerations will prevail, 
thereby increasing the costs imposed on 
future generations. A presentist bias in 
policymaking is all the more concerning 
given humanity’s ever-increasing 
capacity to inflict widespread, severe and 
persistent harm. The quest for sound 
anticipatory governance, therefore, must 
include the design and implementation 
of mechanisms to ameliorate this bias.
Assessing the quality of anticipatory 
governance – possible criteria
How might we assess how well 
governments are protecting the long-
term interests of their current and future 
citizens? Put differently, how should the 
quality of anticipatory governance be 
evaluated? To address such questions 
properly would be a major undertaking. 
Here some brief observations and initial 
suggestions must suffice.
... sound anticipatory governance 
requires policymakers to identify, assess, 
manage and mitigate multiple risks.
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First, assessing the quality of 
anticipatory governance is part of the 
wider task of judging the overall quality 
of governments, public institutions and 
systems of public governance. Good 
governance must be anticipatory. But it 
must also be many other things: legal, 
honest, legitimate, democratic, effective, 
efficient, fair, accountable and much else. 
There is, however, no clear boundary to 
delineate the anticipatory part of good 
governance. Anticipatory governance is 
not simply about good planning for the 
future. And even if it were, good planning 
is demanding and requires many things: 
comprehensive and reliable information, 
excellent monitoring and reporting, 
capable staff, adequate resources, 
sound analytical tools and robust 
decision-making processes. Accordingly, 
assessments of anticipatory governance 
take us well beyond the confines of 
specific activities like strategic planning, 
foresight methods, risk management or 
emergency management.
Second, all assessments of the 
quality of governance involve the 
exercise of judgement and are 
potentially controversial. In the case 
of anticipatory governance there are 
some very obvious challenges. For one 
thing, our knowledge base is limited. 
We lack the luxury of jumping decades 
or centuries forward in time and then 
looking back to assess how well the 
governments of the early 21st century 
prepared for, and navigated, the future. 
Historians many generations from now 
will enjoy the benefit of such hindsight, 
but we do not. Hence, any assessment 
today will necessarily be imperfect and 
incomplete. 
For another, we cannot simply 
rely on current performance data or 
projections of existing trends (Aaron, 
2000). Historical data, after all, may be 
unreliable for judging future perform-
ance – whether that of our economy, 
public institutions or regulatory 
frameworks. And abrupt economic, 
social, cultural, environmental or 
technological changes may render 
current trajectories invalid. At the same 
time, currently available data are not 
totally irrelevant. Indeed, in some cases 
existing data are extremely useful for 
assessing whether particular long-term 
interests are being adequately protected. 
For instance, if there is evidence of 
widespread environmental degradation 
and species loss, then the long-term 
implications are unmistakeable: future 
generations will inevitably be harmed.
There is a further problem assessing 
the quality of anticipatory governance. 
While numerous criteria can be 
suggested, many of these are hard to 
operationalise and apply. For instance, 
one of the many possible tests of good 
anticipatory governance is whether 
policymakers and public managers 
value and promote resilience. The idea 
of resilience – which is the focus of 
increasing attention internationally – 
includes flexibility and adaptability, the 
capacity to bounce back to a desired 
equilibrium after a shock, and the ability 
to absorb chronic stresses or abrupt 
impacts without serious damage or 
disruption (Warren, 2014). As defined 
in the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2009), 
it means:
The ability of a system, community 
or society exposed to hazards to 
resist, absorb, accommodate to and 
recover from the effects of a hazard 
in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation 
and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions.
But while resilience can be defined, 
assessing the resilience of systems, 
governments, individual public 
institutions, societies or communities 
is far from straightforward. Resilience 
has many features (e.g. robustness, 
redundancy, resourcefulness, responsive-
ness, and the capacity to recover 
or recuperate) (World Economic 
Forum, 2013, pp.38-9). Its relevance 
spans multiple policy domains and 
institutional contexts. And while there 
are numerous possible indicators, the 
relevant data are often unavailable. 
Assessing resilience also raises important 
issues of judgement. What criteria, for 
example, should be used to assess the 
capacity of an economy to absorb a 
major financial shock or a community 
to cope with a large seismic event? How 
much cushion against possible adverse 
outcomes is desirable? How much in-
built redundancy should there be? What 
level of risk is acceptable? How much is 
it reasonable to spend on risk reduction? 
And who should be the judge? This 
is not to suggest that answers to such 
questions are impossible, but every 
answer is likely to be problematic in 
some way. Much the same conclusion 
applies to the challenge of defining and 
applying other important principles 
and concepts of relevance to protecting 
future interests, such as the nature of 
intergenerational justice, sustainability 
and good stewardship (Arrow et al., 
2004; Brown Weiss, 1989; Chichilnisky, 
1996; Zuber, forthcoming).
Third, as suggested earlier, sound 
anticipatory governance has many 
different dimensions and attributes. 
Accordingly, multiple criteria are 
needed to assess how well a particular 
government – and the wider system 
of public governance – is performing. 
While some of these criteria may be 
output- or outcome-oriented, others 
will focus on how political institutions 
and policymaking processes are 
designed. Hence, they will be concerned 
with values, norms, principles and 
... while resilience can be defined, 
assessing the resilience of systems, 
governments, individual public 
institutions, societies or communities is 
far from straightforward.
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procedures. Crucial here is whether 
long-term costs and benefits, as well 
as significant risks and opportunities, 
are brought adequately into short-term 
political focus. Of importance in this 
regard is whether governments make use 
of analytical tools, policy frameworks 
and decision-making processes that 
encourage reflection on long-term 
policy issues and incentivise decision-
makers to devote some of their limited 
time, mental energy and political capital 
to protecting future interests. This, of 
course, begs many questions. How, for 
instance, can the ‘voice’ of the future 
be adequately represented in day-to-
day decision-making? How can political 
incentives be altered so that governments 
feel obliged to address creeping 
problems? How can policymakers be 
encouraged to make ‘hard calls’? How 
can governments increase the durability 
of policy decisions which entail complex 
and often politically charged non-
simultaneous exchanges? How, in other 
words, do we avoid immediate concerns 
crowding out or constantly trumping 
future interests?
While there are no simple solutions, 
there are certainly ways of structuring 
institutional arrangements, analytical 
frameworks and political processes such 
that long-term considerations are more 
likely to figure in the decision-making 
calculus (see, for instance, Ascher, 2009; 
Boston, forthcoming; Boston and Prebble, 
2013; González-Ricoy and Gosseries, 
forthcoming; Helm, 2015; Jacobs, 2011; 
James, 2013; Mansbridge and Martin, 
2013; Ostrom, 2009; Reeves, 2015). These 
include:
•	 requiring	policymakers	to	have	
regard to the best available scientific 
evidence; 
•	 ensuring	a	high	level	of	transparency	
in decision-making at all levels of 
government;
•	 using	analytical	frameworks	to	
formulate policy advice that capture 
the full range of likely costs and 
benefits (e.g. direct and indirect, 
tangible and intangible, etc.);
•	 ensuring	that	the	impact	of	choosing	
different discount rates is fully 
transparent;
•	 instituting	commitment	devices	that	
require the policy ‘system’ to conduct 
regular foresight exercises, undertake 
periodic long-term forecasts and 
projections, and develop long-
term plans (e.g. for conservation, 
infrastructure and other forms of 
public investment);
•	 requiring	governments	to	set	
explicit, meaningful and measurable 
targets (and related milestones) 
for improving outcomes, especially 
regarding significant long-term 
policy challenges;  
•	 establishing	independent	future-
oriented institutions to provide an 
authoritative ‘voice’ for otherwise 
poorly represented long-term 
interests; 
•	 encouraging	respectful	deliberation	
and informed, reasoned debate via 
the use of participatory mechanisms, 
multi-stakeholder forums and 
collaborative policymaking processes; 
•	 nurturing	trust,	shared	values	and	
common goals; and 
•	 seeking	cross-party	agreements	where	
durable long-term commitments are 
needed to address major policy 
problems. 
Finally, there is little prospect of 
developing a single aggregate indicator 
or composite measure of the quality 
of anticipatory governance. There are 
simply too many different variables and 
they cover too many different kinds of 
performance. Instead, a better approach 
would be to employ a performance 
dashboard with multiple criteria and 
a simple scoring regime. This enables 
comparisons over time and between 
governments, but of course it lacks the 
simplicity of a single metric.
With these various considerations 
in mind, Table 3 outlines some of the 
possible criteria for assessing the quality 
of anticipatory governance. Under the 
approach adopted, 17 types of criteria are 
organised within seven broad categories: 
overarching principles; planning processes 
and foresight; policy and regulatory 
frameworks; the representation of future 
interests; performance measures and 
reporting; resilience, risk management 
and emergency management; and 
mechanisms for problem solving and 
consensus building. While relatively 
comprehensive, the table is far from 
complete. Under each category additional 
types of criteria could be added – such 
as those of relevance to different tiers 
of government, specific institutions or 
discrete policy domains (e.g. culture and 
heritage, health, taxation, security, defence 
and international relations). Similarly, 
many extra performance indicators 
could be added. Moreover, the approach 
sketched here provides no ranking of the 
various criteria. Nevertheless, it serves as 
a useful starting point and a good basis 
for further discussion and refinement.
The quality of anticipatory governance in 
New Zealand
How does New Zealand fare against such 
criteria? Currently, no comprehensive or 
detailed evaluation is available. There are, 
however, assessments based on some of 
the suggested criteria. For instance, Ken 
Warren (2014) has helpfully analysed the 
resilience of New Zealand’s economy and 
society, with particular reference to four 
types of capital (financial, human, social 
and natural). Drawing on studies of this 
nature and other available data (e.g. Ryan 
and Gill, 2011), it is reasonable to conclude 
that many of New Zealand’s governance 
arrangements, policy settings and 
regulatory frameworks are appropriately 
future-focused and suitably anticipatory. 
... there is little prospect of developing a 
single aggregate indicator or composite 
measure of the quality of anticipatory 
governance.
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Table 3: Suggested criteria for assessing the quality of anticipatory governance
Types of criteria Brief comment Examples of possible policy requirements and performance indicators
Overarching principles
1 Policy settings should 
be consistent with well-
established principles of 
intergenerational justice.
While there are many different principles of 
intergenerational justice, there is wide support for 
the view that current generations should not inflict 
serious, widespread or irreversible harm or act in ways 
that compromise the capacity of future generations to 
meet their needs. Ideally, current generations should 
act in ways that ensure that future generations are 
better off – as judged on the basis of multiple criteria.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	requirements	for	governments	to	adhere	to	well-
established principles of intergenerational justice.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	requirements	for	governments	to	report	periodically	
on whether their policies are consistent with well-established principles of 
intergenerational justice.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	requirements	for	governments	to	publish	annual	data	
of relevance to distributional and other issues with intergenerational dimensions, 
including a composite index of intergenerational fairness.
2 The	principle	of	
sustainability should be 
embedded in all relevant 
policy frameworks. 
The	concept	of	sustainability	is	open	to	multiple	
interpretations, including the distinction between 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’. Important in this regard is the 
issue of whether, and to what extent, different kinds 
of capital (e.g. financial, manufactured, human, social 
and natural) are substitutable.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	requirements	for	governments	to	comply	with	various	
principles of fiscal responsibility, including achieving and maintaining prudent levels 
of public debt.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	requirements	for	governments,	at	a	minimum,	to	maintain	
the aggregate level of renewable natural capital.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	requirements	for	the	economic	rents	from	the	depletion	
of non-renewable natural capital to be used to fund efforts to enhance stocks of 
renewable natural capital. 
•	 There	should	be	legislative	requirements	for	comprehensive	environmental	
accounting, including the valuing of ecosystem systems.
•	 There	should	be	effective	measures	to	protect	biodiversity.
3 Policymakers at all levels 
of government should be 
obliged to adhere to the 
precautionary principle.
There	are	many	different	versions	of	the	precautionary	
principle, with widely divergent implications for 
decision-making. Key issues include: when and how a 
precautionary approach is applied; where the burden 
of proof should rest for demonstrating the existence 
or absence of a threat of harm; how the potential 
threats should be balanced against other relevant 
considerations; and how responsibility for any harm 
should be allocated.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	provisions	requiring	decision-makers	to	give	effect	to	
the precautionary principle – ideally at the stronger end of the potential spectrum of 
possible interpretations, with the burden of proof resting with those proposing actions 
that may generate a new risk or threat of harm.
4 Public sector managers 
should be required 
to exercise proper 
stewardship (or 
kaitiakitanga) of their 
organisations.
The	notion	of	stewardship,	while	closely	related	to	
sustainability, has implications not only for durability 
and resilience but also for the prudent and responsible 
management of resources.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	provisions	requiring	public	sector	managers	to	exercise	
good stewardship of their organisations, including their assets and liabilities, their 
long-term sustainability, their overall health and capability and their capacity to offer 
high-quality advice to successive governments.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	provisions	requiring	public	sector	managers	to	ensure	
good regulatory stewardship – in the sense that the regulatory frameworks they 
administer are fit for purpose, implemented in a cost-effective manner, and reflect 
changing needs and circumstances. 
Planning processes and foresight
5 Governments should be 
required to undertake long-
term planning of public 
infrastructure.
The	proper	maintenance,	renewal	and	improvement	
of public infrastructure is of critical importance for 
protecting	future	interests.	There	is	no	agreement,	
however, on what constitutes an optimal level of 
investment in infrastructure or how the impacts of 
long-term trends, such as sea-level rise, should be 
taken into account. 
•	 There	should	be	requirements	for	central	and	subnational	governments	to	prepare	
plans and strategies for the management of public infrastructure over a long time 
horizon (e.g. 30 years+).
•	 The	planning	of	public	infrastructure	should	have	proper	regard	to	the	evolving	risk	
environment, including the long-term impacts of climate change and the need for 
adaptive management.
6 Governments should be 
required to undertake 
long-term planning across 
the full range of their 
investment activities.
There	is	a	question	mark	over	what	constitutes	an	
‘investment’, how ‘returns’ on investments should 
be assessed, and when and how investment criteria 
should be applied in allocating public resources.
•	 Governments	should	be	required	to	publish	periodic	national	investment	statements	
assessing the shape, health and evolving value of the Crown’s portfolio of assets and 
liabilities, and forecast changes in the portfolio’s composition and size.
•	 Investment-intensive	government	agencies	should	be	required	to	prepare	long-term	
investment plans.
7 There	should	be	robust	
foresight processes at 
all levels of government, 
including requirements 
for independent bodies to 
report periodically on major 
risks and vulnerabilities 
across the full range of 
policy arenas.
There	are	many	different	methods	and	processes	for	
undertaking foresight, including horizon scanning, 
trend	analysis	and	technology	assessment.	There	is	
merit in institutionalising foresight processes within 
both the executive and legislative branches to ensure 
that risks are identified and that proper attention is 
given to creeping problems.
•	 There	should	be	a	legislative	requirement	for	the	government	to	produce	a	periodic	
report on the future, identifying major risks and vulnerabilities as well as creeping 
problems, and outlining its plans to address these risks and problems.
•	 There	should	be	a	parliamentary	committee	for	the	future	with	responsibilities	
to undertake horizon scanning, investigate long-term policy problems, monitor 
governmental efforts to mitigate and manage risks, and review the government’s 
report on the future.
•	 There	should	be	requirements	for	the	treasury/finance	ministry	to	produce	periodic	
reports on long-term fiscal issues, looking out at least 40–50 years.
•	 There	should	be	a	foresight	unit	within	a	central	agency	with	a	mandate	to	undertake	
foresight projects on major policy issues, conduct assessments of the impact of 
significant new technologies, and coordinate the foresight activities of government 
departments and agencies.
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Types of criteria Brief comment Examples of possible policy requirements and performance indicators
Policy and regulatory frameworks
8 The	long-term	costs	
and benefits of different 
policy options should 
be clearly identified and 
made transparent to 
policymakers.
The	weight	attached	to	long-term	costs	and	benefits	in	
governmental decision-making depends heavily on the 
discount	rate	applied.	There	is	no	agreement	on	the	
optimal discount rate.
•	Whenever	policy	options	entail	long-term	costs	and	benefits	a	range	of	discount	rates	
should be applied in order to ensure that the implications of the discount rate are 
ascertained. 
•	 If	there	is	a	risk	of	irreversible	and/or	catastrophic	long-term	impacts,	an	extremely	
low discount rate should be applied.
9 Regulatory frameworks 
should ensure that all 
significant negative 
externalities are properly 
internalised.
The	internalisation	of	negative	externalities	via	
price-based policies (e.g. polluter-pays) helps ensure 
that long-term costs are properly taken into account 
by policymakers, investors and consumers, thus 
enhancing sustainability and the efficient allocation 
of	resources.	There	are	often,	however,	formidable	
difficulties in assessing the harm caused by various 
activities and determining the appropriate social cost, 
such as the social cost of carbon.
•	 Regulatory	frameworks	should	ensure	that	all	significant	negative	externalities,	such	
as damaging environmental and health impacts, are properly priced.
10 There	should	be	rigorous	
systems for policy learning.
Policy evaluation is critical for the formulation and 
implementation of good policies. Looking back is one 
of the key requirements for looking forward.
•	 All	significant	policies	and	regulatory	frameworks	should	be	periodically	reviewed	and	
evaluated.
•	 Governments	should	be	required	to	report	on	their	responses	to	all	major	policy	
evaluations.
The representation of future interests
11 There	should	be	
independent public 
institutions with a 
legislative mandate to 
speak on behalf of clearly 
specified future-oriented 
interests.
Many future-oriented interests lack effective advocacy 
in democratic processes. Dedicated public institutions 
can help to compensate for this deficiency.
•	 There	should	be	an	independent	public	institution	to	monitor	environmental	
performance and safeguard environmental interests.
•	 There	should	be	an	independent	public	institution	to	represent	the	interests	and	
defend the rights of children.
•	 There	should	be	an	independent	public	institution	with	a	specific	mandate	to	study	
creeping problems and publish periodic reports on major long-term risks.
Performance measures and reporting
12 There	should	be	
comprehensive and 
holistic measures for 
assessing economic, 
social and environmental 
performance and regular 
reporting of outcomes 
across the full range of 
policy domains.
A narrow focus on a limited range of performance 
measures, such as economic indicators like GDP or 
fiscal aggregates, can provide a misleading impression 
of a nation’s overall performance. Comprehensive 
monitoring and reporting is vital to provide a holistic 
and accurate assessment – as well as the evidence 
base for better long-term policymaking.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	provisions	requiring	governments	to	publish	
comprehensive data on performance across all policy domains.
•	 The	information	reported	needs	to	be	presented	in	ways	that	enhance	understanding,	
highlighting warning signals and making feedback ‘intelligent’.
13 Governments should 
be required to publish 
comprehensive national 
balance sheets covering 
all forms of capital, not 
merely public sector 
financial liabilities and 
assets.
The	aim	of	comprehensive	wealth	accounting	and	
national balance sheets covering all forms of capital 
is to provide information on trends in stocks rather 
than merely flows. Calculating comprehensive wealth, 
however, poses huge conceptual, methodological 
and valuation issues. Hence, estimating a nation’s 
net worth is likely to be challenging and possibly 
misguided.
•	 There	should	be	legislative	requirements	for	governments	to	publish	comprehensive	
national balance sheets. 
•	 Companies	should	be	required	to	publish	accounts	that	are	consistent	with	the	
conventions, standards and practices associated with sustainability reporting or 
integrated reporting.
Resilience, risk reduction and emergency management
14 There	should	be	
comprehensive policies 
for disaster risk reduction 
and strengthening the 
resilience of all critical 
infrastructure and 
systems.
Inadequate emergency management, disaster 
preparedness and risk reduction efforts can result in a 
society suffering significant long-term costs. 
•	 Policy	frameworks	should	be	consistent	with	international	best	practice,	such	as	the	
goals and principles of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015). 
This	includes	a	strong	emphasis	on	disaster	risk	management,	preventing	new	risk,	
reducing existing risk and strengthening resilience, and covers both natural and 
man-made hazards, including environmental, technological and biological hazards 
and risks.
•	 All	subnational	governments	should	be	required	to	produce	periodic	reports	on	their	
resilience. 
15 There	should	be	a	
substantial sovereign 
wealth fund. 
Sovereign wealth funds are useful for: a) 
compensating future generations for the loss of natural 
capital and ecosystem services; b) pre-funding some 
of the expected costs of adaptation to climate change 
and other environmental impacts; c) pre-funding 
some of the expected costs of natural and man-made 
disasters and other shocks; and d) pre-funding some 
of the expected costs of population ageing.
•	 There	should	be	a	substantial	sovereign	wealth	fund	–	or	several	funds,	each	with	
clearly specified purposes.
•	 There	should	be	clearly	specified	criteria	for	determining	the	circumstances	under	
which such funds can be drawn down.
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Institutional strengths
To start at the positive end of the 
spectrum:
•	 current	legislative	frameworks	in	
important policy areas such as fiscal 
management, resource management 
and public management embrace one 
or more of the overarching principles 
identified in Table 3;
•	 under	section	10(1)(b)	of	the	
Local Government Act 2002, local 
authorities are required ‘to meet the 
current and future [my emphasis] 
needs of communities for good-
quality local infrastructure, local 
public services, and performance of 
regulatory functions’;
•	 the	rules	governing	financial	
management and accounting in the 
public sector embody a high level 
of transparency and ensure that the 
depreciation of assets is fully costed;
•	 the	Reserve	Bank	operates	an	
exacting system of prudential 
supervision of the financial sector;  
•	 those	responsible	for	managing	
public infrastructure and 
determining other kinds of capital 
investment are required to produce 
multi-decadal plans; 
•	 major	departments	like	the	
Treasury and the Ministry for the 
Environment have comprehensive 
and holistic analytical frameworks 
to guide their policy analyses, with 
attention being given to multiple 
goals and the full range of capital 
stocks;
•	 the	Treasury	is	required	to	produce	
regular long-term fiscal statements 
looking out 40 years;  
•	 there	is	strong	support	for	evidence-
based policymaking, underscored 
in recent years by the appointment 
of chief science advisors in many 
departments;
•	 there	are	independent	public	
institutions, such as the 
parliamentary commissioner for 
the environment and the children’s 
commissioner, to represent important 
future-oriented interests; 
•	 there	are	requirements	for	public	
agencies to monitor, assess and 
report performance on a relatively 
comprehensive basis; 
•	 there	are	detailed	requirements	for	
risk management and emergency 
management;
•	 there	are	several	public	funds	that	are	
designed to pre-fund future liabilities, 
including the National Disaster Fund 
for major natural disasters, the New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund to cover 
part of the cost of future public pension 
liabilities in the context of an ageing 
population, and a fund administered 
by the Accident Compensation 
Corporation to cover the full lifetime 
costs of accident claims;
•	 multi-stakeholder	mechanisms	are	
employed from time to time to explore 
and negotiate solutions to important 
long-term policy challenges (e.g. 
freshwater management). 
Institutional weaknesses
That said, there are also many areas where 
the requirements for good anticipatory 
governance (e.g. in terms of institutional 
mechanisms, regulatory frameworks and 
decision-making processes) are deficient. 
Important weaknesses include:
•	 the	limited	attention	given	to	the	
principles of intergenerational 
justice in decision-making on policy 
issues with major intertemporal 
implications;
•	 the	relatively	weak	application	of	the	
precautionary principle and the goal 
of sustainability, especially in the 
areas of resource management and 
environmental protection; 
•	 the	lack	of	any	high-level	foresight	
unit in central government or 
requirements for all departments 
and major agencies to conduct 
regular foresight exercises, such as 
horizon scanning, the identification 
of creeping problems and the 
formulation of strategies to address 
them;
•	 the	absence	of	requirements	for	
governments to prepare periodic 
reports on the future, including on 
major long-term issues;
•	 the	lack	of	a	parliamentary	select	
committee with a mandate to focus 
on future-oriented policy challenges 
and intergenerational issues;
•	 the	limited	requirements	for	
governments to protect the nation’s 
aggregate level of renewable natural 
capital or retain a substantial part of 
resource rentals within a sovereign 
wealth fund (e.g. to compensate 
future generations for the loss of 
non-renewable natural capital); 
•	 the	absence	of	comprehensive	wealth	
accounting or national balance sheets 
covering most or all forms of capital;
•	 the	relatively	limited	application,	at	
least to date, of the Treasury’s Living 
Standards Framework to policy 
analysis and governmental decision-
making;
•	 the	use	of	a	relatively	high	discount	
rate in cost–benefit analyses (up to 
8%);
Types of criteria Brief comment Examples of possible policy requirements and performance indicators
16 There	should	be	regular	
‘stress tests’ to evaluate 
the resilience and 
adaptive capacity of 
public institutions, policy 
settings and regulatory 
frameworks.
In the context of deep uncertainty and unavoidable 
risks, it is imperative to seek a high level of 
resilience and adaptive capacity, at multiple levels of 
governance.
•	 Public	institutions	should	be	required	to	stress-test	their	resilience	periodically,	using	
a range of criteria.
•	 There	should	be	regular	independent	reviews	of	whether	current	policy	settings	and	
regulatory frameworks are fit for purpose.
Mechanisms for problem solving and consensus building for long-term policy challenges
17 Governments should use a 
wide range of participatory 
processes for policymaking 
on long-term issues.
Participatory processes of various kinds can be useful 
in enhancing public understanding, building trust, 
securing agreement on shared goals, and negotiating 
solutions to complex intertemporal issues.
•	 There	should	be	a	significant	public	investment	in	deliberative	processes,	multi-
stakeholder forums and collaborative governance arrangements, especially for 
issues with significant intertemporal dimensions and where solutions require non-
simultaneous exchanges.
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•	 the	absence	of	a	comprehensive	
national policy framework for 
managing the impacts of climate 
change;
•	 the	limited	investment	in	assessing	the	
economic, social and environmental 
implications of new technologies;
•	 the	absence	of:	1)	a	comprehensive	
national risk register; 2) a 
comprehensive risk assessment and 
plan for risk reduction; 3) regular 
stress-testing of resilience and 
adaptive capacity; and 4) regular 
reporting on disaster events, disaster 
risks and actions to reduce disaster 
risks (although natural hazards are 
well identified, a National Hazards 
Research Platform was established in 
2009 to provide long-term funding 
for research on natural hazards, 
and one of the 11 National Science 
Challenges focuses on Resilience to 
Nature’s Challenges) (Basher, 2016); 
and
•	 the	relatively	modest	use	of	
deliberative processes, multi-
stakeholder forums and collaborative 
governance mechanisms to address 
major long-term policy challenges 
– although such arrangements are 
now viewed more favourably by the 
current government.
In summary, the New Zealand policy 
system lacks many of the commitment 
devices, both of a substantive and a 
procedural nature, that oblige decision-
makers to take future-oriented interests 
into account, adhere to future-related 
policy principles or report regularly on 
their performance in addressing long-
term policy challenges. Such devices 
cannot, of course, guarantee that 
governments will make decisions that 
protect future interests, but they can help 
reduce the extent to which such interests 
are ignored.
Policy outcomes – a very mixed record
The weaknesses in institutional design 
identified above have almost certainly 
contributed to New Zealand’s very 
mixed performance in recent decades, as 
judged by various economic, social and 
environmental indicators. On the one 
hand, there are important policy domains, 
such as fiscal and monetary policy, where 
strong commitment devices have been 
implemented to protect future-oriented 
interests (i.e. via the Public Finance Act 
1989 and the Reserve Bank Act 1989). 
With little doubt these devices have had a 
positive impact on decision-making and 
policy outcomes. Over recent decades, for 
instance, New Zealand has achieved an 
enviable record with regard to inflation 
(except for asset prices) and fiscal 
management – as reflected in the substantial 
reduction in net public debt since the early 
1990s (Buckle and Cruikshank, 2013; 
Gemmell and Gill, 2016).
On the other hand, there are many 
policy areas where outcomes have been 
far less satisfactory, often with significant 
intergenerational implications. Examples 
include: 
•	 relatively	high	rates	of	childhood	
poverty and material deprivation, 
including the limited public 
investment in mitigating 
disadvantages experienced during 
early childhood (Boston and 
Chapple, 2014);
•	 high	(and	increasing)	rates	of	adult	
and childhood obesity, with almost 
a third of adults (i.e. those aged 15 
years and over) obese in 2014/15, a 
further 35% of adults overweight but 
not obese, and a third of children 
either obese or overweight (Ministry 
of Health, 2015);
•	 major	housing	challenges,	including	
serious overcrowding, homelessness 
and low-quality private rental 
accommodation, the product of, 
among other things, inadequate 
investment in social housing, weak 
incentives for building low-cost 
homes and substandard regulation 
(Howden-Chapman, 2015);
•	 serious	traffic	congestion	arising	
from poor traffic management 
and inadequate investment in 
public infrastructure, especially in 
Auckland;
•	 weak	environmental	performance,	
arising in part from the poor 
management and inadequate 
protection of certain forms of 
renewable natural capital (e.g. 
freshwater) (Joy, 2015);
•	 one	of	the	world’s	worst	records	
for the loss of native habitat and 
biodiversity (e.g. 799 native species 
were ‘threatened’ in 2011, of which 
417 were in a ‘critical’ state, 175 
‘endangered’ and 207 ‘vulnerable’; 
40% of bird species and 85% of 
native lizards were threatened or at 
risk) (Brown et al., 2015; Warren, 
2014);
•	 a	very	high	rate	of	soil	being	lost	to	
the oceans annually (i.e. about ten 
times the global average) (Hicks et 
al., 2011); and
•	 high	greenhouse	gas	emissions	per	
capita due in part to ineffective 
price-based mechanisms and 
deficient regulatory frameworks 
(Chapman, 2015).
These poor outcomes reflect the failure 
of successive governments to exercise wise 
stewardship and adopt an anticipatory 
approach to policymaking. Too often 
governments have been unwilling to 
make hard policy choices, confront vested 
interests and impose non-simultaneous 
... current governance arrangements 
include a range of procedural and 
substantive commitment devices to 
encourage decision-makers to consider 
future-oriented interests, some of these 
devices are weak and the existing 
framework contains important gaps.
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exchanges. Similarly, unlike the situation 
in some other democracies (e.g. in 
Scandinavia), they have been reluctant 
to use multi-stakeholder mechanisms to 
secure negotiated solutions to complex 
and controversial intertemporal issues.
Suggested reforms
The weaknesses outlined above provide 
a good indication of how New Zealand 
might strengthen its anticipatory 
governance. Five possible areas of reform 
deserve highlighting.
First, while New Zealand’s current 
governance arrangements include a 
range of procedural and substantive 
commitment devices to encourage 
decision-makers to consider future-
oriented interests, some of these devices 
are weak and the existing framework 
contains important gaps. Among the 
changes needed are additional legislative 
requirements for governments to set 
measurable goals and specific targets, 
especially in policy domains with 
significant intertemporal implications. 
Further, both the executive and legislative 
branches should be required to conduct 
regular foresight exercises. To assist 
with such efforts a permanent, high-
level foresight unit modelled on those 
in Britain, Canada or Singapore should 
be established. Governments should also 
be obliged to publish a comprehensive 
register of systemic risks and regularly 
update it. Each of these proposals would 
be reasonably cheap to implement.
Second, the Treasury’s Living Standards 
Framework represents a valuable and 
important step towards developing a more 
holistic – and future-focused – approach to 
policy analysis which encompasses the full 
range of capital stocks and policy impacts 
(Karacaoglu, 2015). But in its current 
form it lacks sufficient specification to 
guide policymaking. In part this is because 
some of the five goals to which the 
framework gives priority are inadequately 
stipulated. For instance, it is unclear what 
is meant by the goal of equity (e.g. which 
material principles of justice are relevant 
for policy purposes and how they should 
be prioritized). Nor does the framework 
provide much guidance about the meaning 
of, or requirements for, intergenerational 
fairness. Similar weaknesses are evident 
in its approach to sustainability. Equally 
significant, the application of the Living 
Standards Framework is limited by the 
absence of a system of comprehensive 
wealth accounting and national balance 
sheets incorporating most or all forms of 
capital (see Arrow et al., 2012; Hamilton, 
2014; Hamilton and Hartwick, 2014; 
Hamilton and Hepburn, 2014). Without 
reliable data on the nation’s comprehensive 
wealth and more specific knowledge about 
how various policy decisions will affect 
particular types of capital (including, 
for instance, the quality and quantity of 
various ecosystem services), there is an 
increased risk of policymakers short-
changing the future. Addressing these 
conceptual, analytical and methodological 
deficiencies will require a substantial 
commitment of intellectual resources.
Third, and related to this, New Zealand 
has been poor at protecting some of its vital 
natural capital (e.g. soil and freshwater) and 
minimising biodiversity loss. This suggests 
the need for more powerful institutional 
voices to represent environmental interests, 
as well as significant policy reforms 
to minimise negative environmental 
externalities. Among the changes required 
are: stronger national guidance for local 
authorities, with more exacting biophysical 
bottom lines (especially for air, water and 
marine resources); tighter rules to protect 
renewable natural capital, perhaps along 
the lines proposed by Dieter Helm (2015); 
greater compensation for future generations 
to reflect the irreversible loss of non-
renewable resources; and a comprehensive 
strategy to decarbonise the economy and 
prepare for the adverse impacts of climate 
change (especially sea level rise) (Lawrence, 
2016). But given the political power 
wielded by narrow commercial interests 
over recent decades, achieving the required 
reforms will be hard.
Fourth, New Zealand has an abysmal 
record for child abuse, neglect, childhood 
material deprivation and obesity. Children 
represent the country’s future. A failure 
to safeguard their interests is damaging to 
their future life course, thereby increasing 
long-term fiscal costs and reducing social 
and economic returns. Accordingly, 
policies to improve childhood outcomes 
– especially for the least advantaged – 
must be an integral part of any strategy 
to enhance anticipatory governance. In 
this regard, developing an official index 
of intergenerational fairness might 
help focus the attention of citizens 
and policymakers on whether current 
policy settings unduly favour particular 
generations (see Leach and Hanton, 
2015). Also critical is the need for a well-
designed social investment approach 
– the foundations of which are slowly 
emerging (James, 2016).
Finally, as suggested earlier, there is a 
case for experimenting with new ways of 
confronting creeping problems and finding 
lasting solutions to long-term societal 
challenges with politically unpalatable 
intertemporal trade-offs. There is good 
international evidence that deliberative 
mechanisms, multi-stakeholder forums 
and collaborative processes can be useful 
in exposing influential groups to the best 
available evidence, building a common 
understanding of the policy options and 
negotiating durable agreements (James, 
2013; Mansbridge and Martin, 2013). 
Policymakers must be more willing to 
employ such institutional arrangements 
in the interests of better long-term 
governance.
New Zealand has taken significant steps 
to this end in recent decades, most 
notably in the fields of fiscal policy, 
infrastructure planning, public investment 
and public sector management.
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Conclusion
Advancing better government requires 
improved anticipatory governance. As 
argued in this article, such governance 
has many attributes. Above all, it means 
taking care of tomorrow today. Plainly, 
this is a difficult task. Governments 
face a daunting array of risks, incessant 
demands, complex policy trade-offs, and 
much uncertainty – indeed, often deep 
uncertainty. Moreover, there is a constant 
risk that the urgent problems of today will 
divert attention from, and thwart efforts 
to address, the problems of tomorrow. 
As a result, future generations may be 
needlessly and unjustifiably burdened. 
To mitigate such risks, governments 
must take countervailing measures. In 
particular, they need strong commitment 
devices that oblige policymakers to look 
beyond their immediate horizons. This 
includes institutional mechanisms and 
procedural requirements that bring the 
long term sharply and repeatedly into 
short-term political focus, such as regular, 
dedicated and independent analyses of 
intergenerational issues. Governments 
also need, in the face of numerous 
unavoidable risks, to pursue strategies to 
enhance societal resilience and adaptive 
capacity.
New Zealand has taken significant steps 
to this end in recent decades, most notably 
in the fields of fiscal policy, infrastructure 
planning, public investment and public 
sector management. But in many other 
fields, especially social and environmental 
policy, the current policy institutions and 
frameworks are deficient. As a result, the 
country is running substantial social and 
ecological deficits and accumulating large 
liabilities. In some cases, regrettably, the 
consequences will be irreversible. We have 
a responsibility to future generations to 
do better. 
This article has offered some initial 
thoughts on the nature of anticipatory 
governance, how it might be assessed 
and how it can be improved. We all have 
an interest in taking up the challenge. 
Safeguarding our future depends on it.
1 The concept of a ‘commitment device’ refers to a mechanism 
that is designed to change the structure of intertemporal 
pay-offs and/or limit future discretion by binding a person, 
organisation or government to a particular course of action. 
Commitment devices can take many different forms, from 
marriage vows to multi-party agreements. In the policy 
realm they can include constitutional or quasi-constitutional 
mechanisms, procedural and substantive devices, and 
mechanisms that are designed to insulate decisions from 
short-term political influence (e.g. transferring decision-
rights to an independent group of experts) (see Boston, 
forthcoming; Reeves, 2015).
2 Resource management and environmental protection are 
major exceptions to these centralising tendencies.
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